Game Theoretic Analysis

Game Theoretic Analysis

Leon A Petrosyan, David Wing Kay Yeung


  • Description
  • Author
  • Info
  • Reviews


This is a collection of recent novel contributions in game theory from a group of prominent authors in the field. It covers Non-cooperative Games, Equilibrium Analysis, Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values in static and dynamic contexts.

Part 1: Non-cooperative Games and Equilibrium Analysis

In game theory, a non-cooperative game is a game with competition between individual players and in which only self-enforcing (e.g. through credible threats) alliances (or competition between groups of players, called 'coalitions') are possible due to the absence of external means to enforce cooperative behavior (e.g. contract law), as opposed to cooperative games. In fact, non-cooperative games are the foundation for the development of cooperative games by acting as the status quo. Non-cooperative games are generally analysed through the framework of equilibrium, which tries to predict players' individual strategies and payoffs. Indeed, equilibrium analysis is the centre of non-cooperative games. This volume on non-cooperative games and equilibrium analysis contains a variety of non-cooperative games and non-cooperative game equilibria from prominent authors in the field.

Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values

It is well known that non-cooperative behaviours, in general, would not lead to a Pareto optimal outcome. Highly undesirable outcomes (like the prisoner's dilemma) and even devastating results (like the tragedy of the commons) could appear when the involved parties only care about their individual interests in a non-cooperative situation. Cooperative games offer the possibility of obtaining socially optimal and group efficient solutions to decision problems involving strategic actions. In addition, axiomatic values serve as guidance for establishing cooperative solutions. This volume on cooperative games and axiomatic values presents a collection of cooperative games and axiomatic values from prominent authors in the field.

  • Introduction (David W K Yeung and Leon A Petrosyan)
  • Part 1: Non-Cooperative Games and Equilibrium Analysis:
    • On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model (J M Binner, F Ciardiello, L R Fletcher and V N Kolokoltsov)
    • Maximin and Minimax Strategies in Two-Players Game with Two Strategic Variables (Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka)
    • Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project (Sebastien Rouillon)
    • Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games: A New Approach via Information Updating (David Yeung and Ovanes Petrosian)
    • Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction (Fouad El Ouardighi, Gary Erickson, Dieter Grass and Steffen Jørgensen)
    • Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem (V V Mazalov and A V Melnik)
    • Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly (Koji Okuguchi and Takeshi Yamazaki)
    • Second-Price All-Pay Auctions and Best-Reply Matching Equilibria (Gisèle Umbhauer)
    • Cournot Equilibrium Uniqueness: At 0 Discontinuous Industry Revenue and Decreasing Price Flexibility (Pierre Von Mouche and Takashi Sato)
    • Quantifying Commitment in Nash Equilibria (Thomas A Weber)
    • Equilibria in Dynamic Multicriteria Games (Anna Rettieva)
    • Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium (Jacek B Krawczyk and Mabel Tidball)
    • Substitution, Complementarity, and Stability (Harborne Stuart Jr)
  • Part 2: Cooperative Games and Axiomatic Values:
    • On Analyzing Cost Allocation Problems: Cooperation Building Structures and Order Problem Representations (John Kleppe, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx and Hans Reijnierse)
    • Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre- and Post-Brexit Context (Evangelos Toumasatos and Stein Ivar Steinshamn)
    • Stable Marketing Cooperation in a Differential Game for an Oligopoly (Mario A García-Meza, Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova and José Daniel López-Barrientos)
    • A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean Technology Development (David W K Yeung and Leon A Petrosyan)
    • Partnership's Profit Sharing: Linear and Nonlinear Contracts (Yigal Gerchak and Eugene Khmelnitsky)
    • Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core (Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon and T S H Driessen)
    • Strong Strategic Support of Cooperation in Multistage Games (Leon Petrosyan)
    • A Solution Concept Related to 'Bounded Rationality' for Some Two-Echelon Models (Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano and Natividad Llorca)
    • Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining Solution (Michael R Caputo)
    • Optimal Fair Division for Measures with Piecewise Linear Density Functions (Jerzy Legut)
    • An Extension of the Solidarity Value for Environments with Externalities (Julio Rodríguez-Segura and Joss Sánchez-Pérez)
    • On Harsanyi Dividends and Asymmetric Values (Pierre Dehez)
    • An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games (Giulia Bernardi and Josep Freixas)
    • Indices of Criticality in Simple Games (Marco Dall'Aglio, Vito Fragnelli and Stefano Moretti)

Readership: This book can serve as a reference for students and professionals looking to understand game theory. It will also provide useful guidance to researchers and policy-makers as it is a collection of the most up-to-date contributions from prominent authors in the field. Game Theory;Non-Cooperative Game;Cooperative Game;Game Equilibria;Axiomatic Value;Multi-Agent Optimization;Dynamic Games0Key Features:
  • This handbook includes selected articles from the 13th European (formerly Spain–Italy–Netherlands) Meeting on Game Theory (SING13), held in Paris (France) at the Paris-Dauphine University on 5–7 July 2017
  • This handbook is a comprehensive collection of applications on both Non-cooperative and Cooperative Games; ranging from Supply Chain operations interacting with Marketing, to Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Finshery policy in a Pre- and Post Brexit context